Introduction
In this paper, we propose a dynamic theory of beliefsharing which dens with certain processes of forming and revising shared beliefs during cooperative dialogues.
Since Clark & MarshNl(1981) the problem of determination of the referents of referring expressions has been discussed in relation to mutual knowledge. In natural language processing, there haw~ also been several studies treating this problem of referent-determination in terms of mutuN knowledge (Perrault &: Cohen, 1981; Joshi, 1982; Nadathur & Joshi, 1983; Appelt, 1985) . In this paper, we conceive referent-determination as a process of belicfsllaring in dialogues, and propose a formal theory of dialogue in which referent-determination can be characterized as part of belief-sharing processes. We use Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) to model the characteristics of referents in discourse (Kamp, 1981 (Kamp, , 1990 Asher, 1993) , and propose a model of dynamic maintenance of the mutual beliefs of tile participants in diNogues based on Clause Maintenance System (CMS) (Doyle, 1979; Levesquc, 1989; Poole, 1988; Reggia, 1983 ; de Kleer, 1986 ; Rciter & de Kleer, 1987) . By this nmdel, we characterize the relationships between a diMogue process and its successfulness, which is mainly illustrated by examples of referent-determination but can be applied to any type of belief-sharing.
Dynamic Maintenance Shared Beliefs of 2.1 DRS
However cooperative, real-world dialogues are fraught with hedges, understatements, or even white lies, which would necessitate introducing a distinction between what is literally conveyed by an utterance, and its real intent on the part of both speaker and hearer. In this study, however, we restrict ourselves to those cases without such complications, and assume that an utterance reflects the speaker's intent in a straight manner, and is taken as such by the hearer. The content of an utterance is represented in tile following style: terer. Given ¢ as a condition, Bel(ce, ¢) reads "the partMpant a believes ¢." n is called the rank of ¢ with regard to its embedding within belief operators. Conditions of rank O are called bare formulas, while those with a rank greater than 0 belief formulas. K represents the shared beliefs formed through a dialogue between the two participants a and b. The conditions in SRP indicate a recursive embedding of self-referentiN belief sturueture with regard to eo,nmon knowledge, and are assumed throughout the dialogue. By contrast, DB(K) is empty when a dialogue starts off. Thus, at the outset of a dialogue, the DRS Ko = ({a, b}, {Bel(a, Ko), Bel(b, K0)}). As an utterante is made, new discourse entities may be introduced, making it necessary to add new conditions to DB(K) and sometimes to retract or negate part of the conditions in DB(K). With the progress of the dialogue, the DRS changes front K0 ~ K1 ~ ... =~ Kn =:~ ...
Since only cooperative dialogues are considered, the goal is to arrive at a DRS in which no contradictory beliefs arc held by the participants. But this goN is not Mways achieved. We Nso assume that at certain points of a dialogue, the participants can hold contradictory beliefs, and that tile same pariticipant Call hold contradictory beliefs at dill?rent points of a dialogue, whereas the s;Hne particip~mt cannot hold contradictory beliefs ¢tt any partic:ular point.
In what follows, we just indicate DB(K) unless otherwise noted.
2.2
How shared belieig are registered
An utterance made by ~ 1)~rticipmlt in a. diMogue is transformed into a condition(s) and registered in DB(K), folh)wing the constrMnts stetted beh)w. First, discourse referents m'e taken to be epistemological entities without counterparts in snrfacc senten('es, but introduced into the DRS by the participants of ~ diMogue, and of which prot)erties corresponding to surface linguistic expressions are l)redicared. Thus, an utterance (2) a: Sato is a student is not anMyzed ~s
with the discourse referent a" introdu(:ed into U~¢ 1)y a, and the predicates corresponding to expressions in the utterauce.
Second, an utterance is registered not in the form of a bare formula., but in the fl)rm of a 1)elief forlnula indicating the t)elief agent. (4), tbr example, is registered as (5) .Bcl(a, Sato(x) ), Bel(a, student(x)) because at (2), b has not agreed with or opl)osed a's utterance. Note theft (5) is nevertheless ;t shared belief t~t this point. Suppose (6) is uttered folh)wing upon (2): (6) 
This utterance is interpreted as
and so registered in DB(K). At this t,oint, both (5) and (7) are shared beliefs, which me,ms (4) DB(K) can bc derived fl'om DB(K') without using this axiom, since K tt~us the self-referential part SRP. But the converse does not hold. The ttxiom of shared belief Mlows the rank of shared beliefs to be zero, while the conditions in general are initially registered with a rtmk higher than zero.
Third, there is involved a step of identification in the transition front b's utterance of (6) to the condition (7) . Just as the discourse referent x was introduced by a's utterance of (2), b introduces a (listinct discourse referent y, in terms of which (9) BelCh, S.to(y)), Bed(b, student(y)) is registered in DB(K). We ~uSSulne that a and b ~gree to tiu', identity of x and y ~Lt this point.
To sum up, in dialogue (2), (6), DB(K) is composed of (5) ahme when (2) is uttered, hut is extended by the utterance of (6) 
Bel(a, student(:r) ), Bet(a, student(y)), Bel( b, student(a,)), BelCh, student(y)).
By applying the axioin of shared belief, mid x =: y, we obta.in 
t(x)), Bel(h,oJlice_cle, rk(x)).

Diachronic analysis of dialogue
In this section, we consider the changes DRS's undergo in the course, of ~t dialogue. In (2), (6) in the previous section, we saw a case where a DRS with nothing but shm'ed beliefs is successfiflly obtMned in one inning, so to speak, without incurring any conflict. We will look at the other three kinds of cases in which conflicts are treated in particular ways which tMlnit of formMization in terms of CMS.
Direct solution of conflicts
Consider the following dialogue. which is shared by a and b.
Indirect solution of conflicts
Consider the following dialogue. reflects the process of deciding which is to be preferred by tracing the source of each condition. That is~ when one cannot choose between two conflicting conditions Pl and p2 on their own account, one replaces Pl and p2 by ql, ql --* Pl and q2, q~ '~ P2~ respectively, and decide which of ql, q2 is to be preferred so that one can avoid the conflict by retracting the weaker condition in favor of the stronger.
Conflicts ending in a draw
Consider the following case. As (24.3) indicates, there is no retractable belief in DB(K), which caused the diMog to end in a breakdown.
Formalization of diachronic analysis
The processes of belief revision illustrated in 3.1 through 3.3 can be h)rmalized as in (27 
Synchronic analysis of dialogue
Next, according to Ogata(1993) , we consider a classification which characterizes the degree of belief sharing for the t)articipmtts at a l)articular point of the conversation, and the eorre(:tness of the shared beliefs. BeI in DB(K), and PI(E) I-E~. This is a case of breakdown ,'~s seen in (25). We call titese three ('~uses, respectively, 1) obserw~tionally susscessful, 2) observ~Ltionally consistent, and 3) obserw~tionally unsuccessful.
Take the ease of (2), (6) again. Tit(, dMogue was successfiflly terminated because the Sato a had in mind and the Sato b had in mind were both students. But suppose a's Sato was a student in the linguistics de-1)artm(mt, and b's Sato in the AI department, (.hat is, they were different persons. Or suppose a and b had the same Sato in rain(|, but that he was no longer a student ;~t the time. These two eases are obscrwttionally suc(:essfifl, hut the partMpants end a 1) with the wrong beliefs. In order to meet this gat) ~ we introduce a standard of correctness that might be eml)odied by God's viewpoint, the reality, or the conventions of the language community to which the 1)articipants belong. We call this standard the facts. The categories in (28) are further broken down relative to the facts as in (29) 2) observationally consistent a) m(E') V El, 1,) m(s') ~ u.
3) obserwttionally unsuccessful
PI(E I) F ~.
We cM1 la) strongly successful, 2a) strongly consistent, and the rest (the cases where PI(N ~) F n) strongly unsuccessful. A comparison of (28) and (29) suggests the folh)wing implications whose converses do not hold:
(3(I) a) strongly successfltl ~ observationally successtiff 1)) obserwt.tionally m~suc('.essful -~ strongly unsu(:cessful c) strongly consistent -~ observationally consistent
Characterization of expressions referring to individuals
We consider the problem of how the concepts of success introduced in the previous section might be applied to the dialogues identifying the denotation of individual terms, especially proper nouns. By indicating a's intended referent, b's intended referent, and the semantic referent by Ta, Tb, and Tcom, respectively, we can summarize what has been discussed above as follows:
(42) strongly successful: Tcom = Ta = Tb, observationally successful: Ta = Tb, strongly unsuccessfld: Tcom ¢ Ta, Tcom ~ Tb, observationally unsuccessful: Ta ~ Tb.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a system which combines DRS with CMS, and an Mgorithm for the dynamic revision of shared beliefs in cooperative dialogues. Further, the degree of success in dialogues was formalized. Still, the following problems remain to be solved: 1) The treatment of background knowledge must be made precise. E.g., 'Sato ~ 203' in (23), or 'Vx(Muranishi(x) -~ "~Hokuto(x))' in (25) is implicitely introduced into the inference without explanation of its origin.
2) The translation procedure of an utterance into the condition of DRS must be formalized. 3) It's necessary to give a semantic foundation to our systenl. 4) hnplelnentation of a system which simulates our dialogue mechanism.
